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EXEMPTION OF WAGES FROM EXECUTION UNDER
INDIANA STATUTE
The recent decision of the Appellate Court in the case of
Lauer Aato Co. v. Moody, 154 N. E. 501, has been of particular
interest to the bar as constituting the first judicial construction
of Chapter 61, Acts of 1925,' which provides for the levying of
execution against indebtedness owed to the judgment debtor,
and against salaries, wages and other income received by him.
The case involved an application for such an execution, resisted
by the judgment debtor on the ground that his total property,
including the wages then due to him from his employer, was
less than six hundred dollars. He therefore claimed exemption
under the general exemption law of the state.2 A demurrer in-
terposed by the judgment creditor was sustained, the court
holding that the debtor was entitled to no exemption from exe-
cution against his wages.
The nature of the statute involved has already been indicated.
It applies only if execution has previously been returned unsat-
isfied, which fact must be shown by affidavit of the judgment
creditor. When satisfied of the proper jurisdictional facts, the
court issues an order to be served on the employer or other per-
son indebted to the judgment debtor, and the judgment thereby
becomes a lien on all debts, salaries and other income then and
thereafter owed to the judgment debtor by any person upon
whom such order is served. Such person is required to pay
over to the officer serving the execution the amount specified in
the order, which however is not to be an excess of ten per cent
of the amount payable to the judgment debtor. It is further
provided that no more than one such execution may be enforced
at the same time, although a new debtor to the judgment debtor
may be brought in-a provision chiefly applicable when the lat-
ter changes his job. It should also be noted that all fees and
costs in excess of three dollars are to be paid by the creditor.
Under this statute the most important question is the one pre-
sented in the principal case-that is, whether such an execution
is subject to the general exemption laws of the state, or is to be
treated as applicable regardless of such exemption. The par-
ticular provisions of the statute bearing on this point will be
considered hereafter. It is clear, however, that the present atti-
tude of the court that this statutory execution is not subject to
the general exemption laws of the state is contrary to its pre-
vious attitude respecting exemptions.
1 Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, Secs. 889-897, inc.
2 Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, Secs. 769-778, inc.
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Article I, Section 22, of the Constitution provides:
"The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life
shall be recognized by wholesome laws exempting a reasonable amount of
property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability here-
after contracted."
While this constitutional provision has been uniformly held
not to be self-executing, 3 yet all of the exemption statutes passed
by the Legislature have been given a most liberal construction
in favor of the debtor.4 The principal case seems to involve a
departure from this rule, and it is certainly a departure from the
rule of Pomeroy v. Beach which holds that a resident of the
state is exempt from having his wages garnished if his prop-
erty is less than six hundred dollars, the amount then and now
specified in the general exemption statute. In the principal
case the court refers to the Pomeroy case but distinguishes it
on the ground that the present statute indicates a contrary pol-
icy on the part of the Legislature.
On the other hand, there have always been some statutory or
judicial limitations as to exemptions, indicating that such rights
have been treated as conditional rather than absolute. A stat6
statute provides that there are no exemptions as against holders
of mechanics' liens, purchase money obligations or taxes.6 It
must be conceded that this statute is merely declaratory of the
common law in practically every jurisdiction but it does restrict
the "privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of
life".7 Furthermore the courts have decided that there is no
exemption as against claims for alimony8 and against claims for
funeral expenses and medical expenses in the last illness.9
It seems clear therefore that the Legislature, at least, is not
bound by any rigid rules as to the enactment or retention of
exemptions. The question is solely one of what the Legislature
meant and this question is to be solved not only by an examina-
3 Green v. Aker, 11 Ind. 223; Coppage v. Gregg, 1 Ind. App. 112, 27
N. E. 570.
4 Kelly v. McFadden, 80 Ind. 536; Astley v. Capron, 89 Ind. 167; Cleve-
land, etc., Ry. Co. v. Ma,'shall, 182 Ind. 280, 105 N. E. 570. This principle
has been carried so far that a defendant has not been allowed to set off a
just claim against the plaintiff when the latter has less than the statutory
minimum of property so that the claim could not have been collected di-
rectly. Butner v. Bowser, 104 Ind. 255, 3 N. E. 889; Junker v. Hustes, 113
Ind. 524, 16 N. E. 197.
5 149 Ind. 511, 49 N. E. 370.
6 Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 782.
7 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 22, supra.
s Menzie v. Anderson, 65 Ind. 239.
A Fleming v. Henderson, 123 Ind. 234, 24 N. E. 236.
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tion of the statute itself, but in the light of other relevant statutes
and by a consideration of the past policy of the state as exem-
plified by its legislative and judicial authorities. This last consid-
eration would indicate that the Legislature is not to be expected
to have thus limited the general six hundred dollar exemption,
but this argument is obviously indecisive. It might further be
urged that wages and other income are technically and substan-
tially in the category of "property" and therefore within the
general exemption law, especially in view of the first section of
the Execution Act of 1881,10 specifying three kinds of execu-
tion but not differentiating income from other personal prop-
erty. There are comparatively few authorities on this point
and they are somewhat conflicting." It is submitted that sal-
ary, wages, etc., belong generically within the category of prop-
erty but that the court is nevertheless correct in considering the
question from the standpoint of the intent of the Legislature,
which may not have thus regarded the situation. The authori-
ties are likewise conflicting as to whether a general waiver of
exemptions covers wages and salaries' 2-again showing that
there is considerable tendency in this connection to distinguish
such items from tangible property. No decisive results can
therefore be obtained from such general considerations. The
only recourse is to examine the statute itself and to consider the
construction of any similar statutes in other states. Judicial
construction of a statute from which the Indiana statute was
borrowed is of course of great weight'--indeed practically bind-
ing-upon the courts of this state.13
Examining the statute itself, the first striking provision is
that of Section 214 providing that the judgment becomes a lien
upon salaries, wages, income, etc., "notwithstanding any exemp-
tion law now in force." If this were all, the result of the prin-
cipal case it would be inevitable. The only possible question
10 Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 739.
11 See e. g. Gregory v. Evans, 19 Mo. 262, holding that wages are not
"propetty" within the state exemption law, and McKelvay v. South Carolina
R. R. Co., 6 S. C. 446, holding that wages are -property subject to attach-
ment.
12 Smith v. Johnson, 71 Ga. 748 holds that waiver of all exemption
rights does not include exemption of wages; McCormick Harvesting Ma-
chine Co. v. Vaughan, 130 Ala. 314, 30 So. 363 reaches precisely the oppo-
site result. It will be understood, of course, that these apparently con-
flicting decisions may not actually be contradictory, because of the pos-
sible differences in the state statutes.
13 Robertson v. Ford, 164 Ind. 538, 74 N. E. 1.
14 Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 890.
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would be the power of the Legislature to enact such a provision
but the affirmative answer to this question can hardly be doubt-
ful. But the legislative intent that the general exemption law
should not affect this statute is not quite so cledr, in view of
Section 615 providing:
"The provisions of this act shall not apply to any account or judgment
which has been assigned or in any manner transferred by the original
holder or owner, nor shall the provisions of this act apply to any income,
claim or demand which is by law now specifically exempted from claims of
creditors."
It can be forcibly argued that this latter provision brings the
general exemption law into the purview of the new statute.
The court however, reaches the opposite conclusion particu-
larly on account of the word "specifically." It is argued that
this word indicates that the Legislature did not intend to refer
to the general exemption statute but to various state and Federal
statutes specifically exempting certain kinds of income from exe-
cution. The court mentions as examples of this, police pen-
sions,16 firemen's pensions, 17 municipal utility employees' pen-
sions,'8 claims paid under the Workmen's Compensation Act,' 9
and United States pensions. 20 To these may be added teachers'
pensions, 21 exempt under the state law, and compensation to
United States employees, 22 compensation to representatives of
postal employees killed on duty,23 seamen's wages24 and allot-
ments, allowances and compensation payable under the Federal
War Risk Insurance Act,25 all of which are exempt from execu-
tion under the Federal laws. It can hardly be denied that the
position of the court has considerable force although it might
perhaps be doubted if the Legislature, by this somewhat ambig-
uous language, intended to change so definitely the settled policy
of the state with respect to exemptions.
The court also points out that the Indiana statute was largely
copied from a New York statute originally constituting Section
1391 of the Code of Civil Procedure of that state but now embod-
15 Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 894.
16 See Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 10921.
17 See Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 10934.
Is See Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 10945.
1.9 See Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 9462.
20 See U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 9080.
21 See Burns' Annotated Statutes 1926, sec. 7033.
22 See U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 8932m.
23 See U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 7246b.
24 See U. S. Comp. Stat., sec. 8325a.
25 See U. S. Comp. Stat., sec 514nnn.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
ied in Section 648 of the Civil Practice Act. Any New York
decisions upon the point at issue would of course be of great
weight 26 but there are none which are very decisive. The opinion
in the principal case cites Smith v. Endicott-Johnson Corp.,2 7
which, ho~vever, is not very closely in point since it merely holds
that a claim under the section is a property right and therefore
assignable. However the previous case of Brearey School V.
Ward,28 which upholds the New York statute and gives a very
detailed analysis of its application, has considerable language
which supports the position of the Indiana court in the principal
case.
It is submitted that, purely from the standpoint of statutory
construction and judicial authorities, the result reached by the
court is defendable but not clearly right, especially as it involves
a very considerable departure from the previous legislative and
judicial policy of the state. The question still remains whether
the result reached by the court is desirable. Such considerations
of policy may have well-nigh decisive force in view of the uncer-
tainty of the application of more mechanical tests. On this point
it is submitted that the case may clearly be supported. The
result is not in any way a violation of the spirit of the constitu-
tional provision with respect to exemptions, 29 in view of the
fact that the execution is effective only to the extent of ten
per cent of the judgment debtor's income and that only one
such execution is permitted at the same time. No matter how-
ever heavily indebted he is, he can still enjoy ninety per cent of
his income free from the claims of his creditors and this is all
that he can reasonably ask, even though he has no other prop-
erty. The judgment debtor is further protected by compelling
his creditor to pay the fees incident to this sort of execution is
excess of the nominal amount of three dollars. It seems, there-
fore that by no possibility will this construction of the statute
result in any real hardship upon debtors. If the wages of the
debtor are so small as to be insufficient for his bare living
expenses it is improbable that a ten per cent interest in them
would be sufficient to induce a general creditor to go to the
trouble of levying this form of execution, which can only be done
after execution against tangible property has been issued and
returned unsatisfied. It is submitted therefore that the result
reached by the court is sound and that the case should be fol-
lowed. ROBERT C. BROWN.
Indiana University School of Law.
26 Robertson v. Ford, supra.
27 199 App. Div. 194, 192 N. Y. Supp. 121.
2s 201 N. Y. 358, 94 N. E. 1001.
29 Constitution, Art. I, sec. 22, supra.
